


(I) Key Concepts


- * Semiotics: theory of signs
- * Metalanguage & Object language
 - ↳ metatheory of the object language in the metalanguage.
 - ↳ homophonic vs. heterophonic theories
- * signs and expressions → finite sequence of signs
 - ↳ smallest units of a language
- * events & designs
 - ↳ sign-events: a single object or event
 - ↳ sign-design: a kind to which many objects belong
- * pragmatics: explicit reference to user (communication)
- * semantics: expressions and their meanings (no user)
- * syntax: only expressions (no meaning, no user)
- * descriptive semantic/syntax: empirical investigation
- * pure semantic/syntax: more philosophical, systems analysis.

- * semantics: meaning of expressions
- * metasemantics: meaning of "meaning" itself



- use
 - truth
 - contextual factors
 - literal meaning

* language, thought, world:



(II) Compositionality of Meaning

- * compositional semantics: how meaning of smaller expressions contribute to the meaning of complex expressions
- * axioms: word meanings
 theorems: sentence meanings } derived using generative axioms
- * compositionality axioms:
 - ↳ substitutional quantifiers: Σ, Π
 - objectual quantifiers: \exists, \forall
- * Quasi-quotes, Quine quotes: $\ulcorner S \text{ and } P \urcorner \Rightarrow$ used when expressions from meta-l, & object l. are mixed.

T^S and P^T

└─┬─> meta language exp. (variable)
└─┬─> object language exp.

* purpose: understand the mechanism by which meaning of a whole sentence is generated by smaller constituents.

(III & IV) Davidsonian Semantics

* Proposal 1: reference meaning of theory
assign some entity (reference) as meaning
⇒ 't refers to x'

└─┬─> meaning of the sentence
└─┬─> structural description of the sentence
└─> problem acc. Davidson: all sentences alike in truth value have the same reference, i.e. meaning, i.e. are synonymous. (slingshot argument)

└─> "questions of reference are, in general settled with extra linguistic facts, questions of meaning not"

⇒ we need a theory of meaning as distinct from reference

* Proposal 2: assign some entity (not reference) as meaning

⇒ 's means m'

└─> problem acc. Davidson: no specific use, not useful

* Proposal 3: do not assign any entity

's means that p'

└─> problem acc. Davidson: intensional operator, non-extensional operator

* Davidson's theory: s is T if and only if p

' s is true if and only if p '

→ understanding meaning through truth: truth serving as meaning

↳ Tarski's convention T

↳ truth of an object language can only be defined in the metalanguage. Therefore truth, acc. Tarski, is not defined in natural languages

⇒ Formal theory!

↳ Davidson uses convention T to define truth for natural languages as his theory is empirical. Our beliefs, communication, ignorance matters in this theory.

↳ Radical translation: construct a theory of meaning for a speaker of another language
problem: an infinite correlation of sentences alike in truth

we need the charity principle: that the speakers of the other language are telling the truth, by maximizing the self-consistency we assign them or pain of not understanding them.

(V) Frege: The Identity Puzzle

* How is the identity defined: based on name or reference or what?

Morning Star is Morning Star } same semantic content,
Morning Star is Evening Star } different cognitive values
⇒ how to account for this difference?

* First proposed solution: identity holds between names, i.e. linguistic expressions

↳ problem: they are arbitrary!

* Second solution: A linguistic expression has a **sense**, in addition to its reference.

↳ sense: mode of presentation

Puzzle is solved!

$$\text{ref}(\text{"Morning S."}) = \text{ref}(\text{"Evening S."})$$

⇒ same contents

$$\text{sense}(\text{"Morning S."}) \neq \text{sense}(\text{"Evening S."})$$

⇒ different cognitive values

⇒ Sense and Reference Table

LINGUISTIC EXPRESSION	SENSE	REFERENCE
subject term	the way the object is presented	object
predicate term	property	concept
sentence	thought	truth value (the True or the False)

(VI) Frege: Propositional Attitude Puzzle

* Compositionality of Reference

* Leibniz's law: $a = b \rightarrow \phi_a = \phi_b$

* **Extensional context**: A context where coreferential terms can be substituted for each other.

Intensional context: A context where a substitution of (wiki) coreferential terms might compromise the truth-value.

↳ Propositional Attitudes

⇒ Example: "John believes that Superman can fly."
↳ cannot replace "Superman" by "Clark Kent" freely.

Subject has an attitude towards a proposition.

Puzzle: How do we account for the possible change of truth-value of a sentence in intensional context when we make a coreferential substitution?

Frege's solution: Reference Shift

The reference of an expression in an intensional context is its customary sense.

(VII) ARGUMENTS FOR DESCRIPTIVISM

Millian theory of names (A system of logic)

↳ 2 kinds of terms

↳ Non connotative: signifies a subject/attribute only.

↳ Connotative: denotes a subject & implies an attribute. (has a connotation + a denotation)

* Proper names are non-connotative. "Proper names are attached to the objects themselves & are not dependent on the continuance of any attribute of that object."

Descriptivist theory of names

↳ Frege: proper names — ^{associated descriptions} → meanings
"sense"

↳ Russell: ^(ordinary) proper names are disguised definite descriptions

proper names → associated descriptions.

Arguments for ⁽⁺⁾ descriptivist view

↳ Reference fixing: "Aristotle" — descriptions → Aristotle

↳ Identity statements: informative & non-informative
(can solve the puzzle)

↳ Negative existentials: "whether Aristotle ever existed"
Pegasus

(VIII) SINGLE DESC. vs. CLUSTER of DESC.

A historical problem with descriptivism; how do we choose the description? Two answers:

↳ Single Descriptions (Frege): only one of them is the semantic value

↳ Cluster Theory (Searle):
meaning("Aristotle") = desc₁ ∨ desc₂ ∨ ...
a loose relation between the names & descriptions.

(IX) ARGUMENTS AGAINST DESCRIPTIVISM

Separation of Modalities: The relation between metaphysical modality & epistemological modality.

↳ Traditional view (Ayer, Quine)

	A priori	A posteriori
Necessary	YES	NO
Contingent	NO	YES

↳ Kripke:

	A priori	A posteriori
Necessary		YES!
Contingent		

Rigid Designators: A designator is rigid iff there is an object α that it designates with respect to every possible world in which α exists, and never designates

another object with respect to any possible world.

⇒ Proper names are rigid designators, definite descriptions are not.

↳ "Aristotle might not have been the author of Aristotle."

Kripke's three arguments against descriptivism

↳ MODAL ARGUMENT

Strong Descriptivism: meaning("P. name") = assoc. desc.

⇒ meaning("P. name") = meaning("assoc. desc.")

BUT proper names are rigid, definite descriptions are not, so they cannot be identical.

↳ SEMANTIC ARGUMENTS

Insufficient descriptions

"Richard Feynman": a physicist

Wrong descriptions

"Einstein": the inventor of the atomic bomb.

⇒ Associated descriptions do not play a role in designation.

↳ EPISTEMIC ARGUMENT

Weak Descriptivism: descriptions fix the reference

Gödel example: "So, when I determined the name 'Gödel', I don't say to myself 'by "Gödel" I shall mean "the man who proves the incompleteness

theorem, whoever he is", That might turn out to be Schmidt or Post."

There is no way of knowing whether associated descriptions accurately fix the referent of a name.

(X) RUSSEL "ON DENOTING"

2 kinds of knowing

- ↳ Knowledge by acquaintance
- ↳ Knowledge by description

Traditional Subject-Predicate analysis: surface grammar

- All men are mortal.
 - Some philosophers are smart.
 - No philosopher is smart.
 - The present king of France is bald.
- ↳
- $\forall x (\text{man}(x) \rightarrow \text{mortal}(x)) \Rightarrow$ "All man" is not a component
 - $\exists x (\text{Philosopher}(x) \wedge \text{smart}(x))$
 - $\exists x (\text{KoF}(x) \wedge \forall y (\text{KoF}(y) \rightarrow y=x) \wedge \text{Bald}(x))$
 \Rightarrow "The present king of France" is not a component

Three puzzles:

- ↳ **Substitution puzzle:** Scott & Waverly example.
- SOLUTION: "the author of Waverly" is not a component, the problem never occurs. (dissolved)

↳ Law of excluded middle: The present king of France is bald / is not bald

SOLUTION: Interpret the sentence in first order logic
⇒ Narrow / Wide scope negation.

↳ Negative existentials: Pegasus does not exist. What does not exist?

FREGE'S SOLUTION: Pegasus has no referent but a sense.

(Alexius) MEINONG'S SOLUTION: Their ontology consists of objects that do not exist

RUSSELL'S SOLUTION: "Pegasus" is not a component
 $\neg \exists x (Horse(x) \wedge Flying(x))$

(XI) STRAWSON "ON REFERRING"

Different approaches to meaning

↳ logical approach: Frege, Russell, Early Wittgenstein

↳ Ordinary language philosophy: Austin, Strawson, late Wittgenstein

"ordinary language has no exact logic"

Meaning vs. Truth & Reference

↳ Meaning of an exp: General directions for its use to refer to or mention particular objects or persons

Meaning of a sentence: General directions for its

use in making true/false statements.

⇒ The source of Russell's mistake was that he thought that referring or mentioning, if it occurred at all, must be meaning.

Presupposition vs. Entailment

↳ Russell says: "The ϕ is ψ " entails "The ϕ exists."

↳ Strawson says: "The ϕ is ψ " presupposes "The ϕ exists."

For Strawson, there are sentences that are neither true nor false. If there is no "the present king of France", the sentence "the present king of France is bald" is neither true nor false.

For Russell, every sentence must be either true or false.

(XII) DONELLIAN, "REFERENCE & DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS"

Strawson & Russell seem to me to make a common assumption here about the question how definite descriptions function.

Pragmatic ambiguity:

↳ Referential use (DEFINITENESS)

- The object referred
- The attribute of being F is not so important
- No reference failure (Almost)
- Russell & Strawson ignores.

↳ **Attributive use (DESCRIPTIVENESS)**

- Whatever fits the description
- The attribute of being F is important
- Reference failure is possible
- Russell or Strawson may be correct

(The morbi example!)

When nothing fits the description "the F"

↳ Russell: the sentence is false

↳ Strawson: the sentence has no truth value.

⇒ BOTH VIEWS ARE FOR THE ATTRIBUTIVE USE!

Neither Russell's nor Strawson's theory represents a correct account of the use of definite descriptions.

↳ Russell ignores the referential use

↳ Strawson fails to make the distinction between the two and mixes together truths about each.